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Abstract 
Using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, this paper examines 
differences in entrepreneurial perceptions (fear of failure, opportunity perception, self-
efficacy, public opinion) between CEE and non-CEE countries, before and after the 2008 
recession, as well as the effects of these perceptions on entrepreneurial motivation and 
overall levels of activity. The results suggest that CEE countries have systematically more 
pessimistic outlooks in terms of fear of failure and opportunity perception, but no 
difference from non-CEE countries in self-efficacy and public opinion. Additionally, most 
of the difference in fear of failure and opportunity perception, along with an increase in 
necessity-motivated entrepreneurship, comes after the recession, suggesting less durability 
and resilience of optimistic entrepreneurial perceptions in CEE countries. Finally, there is 
evidence of a higher threshold for a perceived opportunity to become a business reality in 
these post-socialist CEE countries. 
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I. Introduction 
A recent New York Times article laments the increasing division between Western 
and Eastern Europe in the European Union, this time marked by the victory of the anti-
establishment party, Ano, in the Czech Republic. Whereas the Visegrad Group1 “once 
stood as a beacon for post-Communist integration, ...today it symbolizes the failure of the 
West to completely integrate Central and Eastern Europe” (Bittner 2017). Bittner blames 
both Western Europe for treating its Eastern counterpart like “second-class citizens,” as 
well as CEE’s “lack of cultural preparedness for the new competitiveness” in the EU due 
to communism’s legacy of immense distrust. He points to CEE’s failure, perhaps not by 
fault but by nature, to change the culture and mindset of its people: “while liberalizing their 
economies, they have forgotten to liberalize their minds.” This last criticism may extend 
beyond politics into the state of entrepreneurial motivations in the post-socialist transition 
economies of CEE as well. Whereas transition is formally considered complete in terms of 
formal economic infrastructure from command to market economies, have the informal 
institutions that motivate entrepreneurship changed sufficiently? Are entrepreneurial 
perceptions and motivations the same in the post-socialist CEE countries as they are in the 
West? Or is there evidence to believe that they are behind in terms of “cultural 
preparedness,” to put it in Bittner’s language? 
While entrepreneurial actions and outcomes have been studied extensively, 
motivations and perceptions surrounding entrepreneurship have been subject to 
significantly less scholarship, particularly in a cross-country or regional comparison 
                                               
1 Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, all of which joined the EU in 2004. 
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context. Most of the literature on entrepreneurship in post-socialist countries focuses on 
the most visible levels of transition regarding entrepreneurship policy and infrastructure, 
as well as their effect on entrepreneurial activity and outcomes. Research on 
entrepreneurial motivations tends to be in the space of leadership psychology, which 
assumes that entrepreneurs are largely innately motivated, using cross sectional data that 
ignores cultural contexts that may change over time. However, it makes sense to study 
motivations and perceptions at the country level and across years because there are 
significant differences and changes in the country-level annual Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor reports2 and, presumably, what differs between countries is culture and shared 
history3. 
I seek to fill these gaps by examining the differences in entrepreneurial perceptions 
between CEE countries and non-CEE countries, and then the effects of these perceptions 
on entrepreneurial motivation and overall levels of activity. I find that CEE countries4 do 
differ significantly from non-CEE countries in fear of failure and opportunity perception 
with more pessimistic outlooks, but not in self-efficacy or public opinion of entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, CEE countries respond differently to the 2008 recession with a greater and 
longer lasting increase in fear of failure and decrease in opportunity perception, as well as 
an increase in necessity rather than opportunity entrepreneurship. I also find that, while the 
nature of entrepreneurship in CEE countries differs in terms of lower overall levels of 
                                               
2 http://www.gemconsortium.org/report  
3 And, of course, development level, access to resources, economic conditions, etc., but let us say that those 
are encompassed by “shared history.” 
4 I am interested in CEE countries, including the Baltic states, because they are widely considered the 
“beacon of post-communist integration,” in Bittner’s terms. Central and Eastern Europe integrated market 
economy infrastructure relatively rapidly and smoothly compared to other formerly communist countries, 
where many still lack structural institutions (or were in the mid-2000s; see Table 1 of EBRD Transition 
Indicators) and suffered a prolonged turnaround time from economic decline to growth in the post-
transition period throughout the 1990s. 
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entrepreneurship and more necessity-motivated entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial 
perceptions, save opportunity perception, do not have a differential effect on 
entrepreneurial activity in CEE countries. There is evidence of a higher threshold for 
opportunity perception, even in cases of necessity entrepreneurship, for one to be an 
entrepreneur in a CEE country.  
Although the Berlin Wall fell over 25 years ago, and although most barriers5 at the 
time of formal transition in the 1990s no longer exist today, it is possible that a cultural 
legacy of communism persists in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The rest of the paper 
explores this possibility by proceeding as follows: Section II discusses the existing 
literature, Sections III and IV examine the data and empirical strategy, Section V analyses 
the results, and finally, Section VI presents the conclusions. 
II. Literature Review 
A. Entrepreneurship in Post-Socialist Economic Transition 
There were two principal schools of thought regarding economic transition: 1) 
reform should take place gradually and cautiously in order to mitigate side effects as much 
as possible and 2) it is best to cut our losses through an immediate and expedient 
liberalization of prices and privatization of state firms. Whereas China and Vietnam, for 
example, belong to the former camp, much of Eastern Europe followed the latter. The 
reasoning is that although private ownership is not a sufficient condition to ensure the 
efficient operation of a market economy, it is a prerequisite (Dana 2005). Many reformers 
                                               
5 E.g. legal insecurity, political instability, lack of financial resources. 
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also drew from the ideas of Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1973), believing that the 
creation of numerous new firms would be the principal mechanism whereby heavily 
industrialized planning structures would be transformed into a market system for allocating 
resources (Estrin and Mickiewicz 2010). However, the reforms of the early 1990s 
concentrated on stabilization and privatization of existing firms rather than supporting new 
ones, and Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008) show that entrepreneurship levels were 
lower in transition economies as a group than in other developed and developing 
economies.  
Szerb and Trumbull (2016) continue this analysis of entrepreneurship in post-
socialist countries into the 2000s and most recent decade. Their results imply that transition 
is over and that these post-socialist countries (except Russia) are on a normal capitalist 
path, with any differences being attributable to different levels of economic development 
rather than having a fundamentally different economic system. My own analysis of EBRD 
transition indicators confirms these results of the completion of transition in terms of 
formal institutions; transition indicators for CEE countries have remained for the most part 
unchanged since 20036. However, Szerb and Trumbull also point out that some “informal” 
characteristics among the former socialist countries likely stem from their shared socialist 
heritage, for example low levels of opportunity perception and cultural support. Thus, 
rather than homogeneous entrepreneurship support policies, they posit that effective 
policies in CEE should fit the particular entrepreneurial inhibitors of the targeted territory. 
Informal institutions like norms and values are as important as formal institutions 
in shaping economic behavior and attitudes. Sztompka (1996)7 argues that communism left 
                                               
6 See EBRD transition indicators table in appendix. 
7 As cited in Minniti 2013. 
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a legacy of norms, which he calls a “bloc culture,” that are not conducive to 
entrepreneurship: priority of dependence over self-reliance, conformity over individualism, 
and rigidity and extremism over tolerance and innovation. Generalized trust is another 
value that is lacking in transition economies, confirmed by the World Value Surveys 
reported by Howard (2000)8, which affects expectations and risk-taking. Informal 
institutions may even have a longer lasting effect than formal ones because of their 
generational transfer. 
The distinctiveness of the transition context has led some authors to question the 
form in which entrepreneurship is manifested. Scase (1997) separates entrepreneurship 
from proprietorship: he defines entrepreneurship as a person’s commitment to capital 
accumulation and business growth, while proprietorship is a prioritization of the ownership 
of property and other assets, which may be used to realize profits but are not used for longer 
term capital accumulation. He emphasizes that proprietors are more likely to consume any 
surplus rather than reinvest in their business, and that proprietors account for the majority 
of small business owners in transition economies because individuals are stimulated by the 
desire for protection from the uncertainties of emerging markets, the thirst for personal 
autonomy, and out of economic necessity. 
The literature on post-Socialist transition economies also draws a distinction 
between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and those of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). CEE economies largely inherited a stronger legal, institutional, and cultural 
framework for successful entrepreneurship, partly because many CEE countries had 
                                               
8 As cited in Minniti 2013. 
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thriving capitalist economies in the nineteenth century and interwar period, and also 
because of CEE countries’ accession to the European Union (Estrin et al. 2009).  
B. Necessity versus Opportunity Entrepreneurship 
An early attempt to define opportunity as opposed to necessity entrepreneurship 
was undertaken by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) when it began its global 
surveys in 1999. GEM asks, “Are you involved in this start-up to take advantage of a 
business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?” However, because 
this definition is subjective and generally unavailable in other datasets, Fairlie and Fossen 
(2017) set out to create an operational definition of necessity versus opportunity 
entrepreneurship using data readily available most economic datasets. They propose using 
initial unemployment status as a proxy for entrepreneurial motivation: individuals who are 
initially unemployed before starting businesses are defined as “necessity” entrepreneurs, 
and individuals who are wage/salary workers, enrolled in school or college, or are not 
actively seeking a job are defined as “opportunity” entrepreneurs. With one of the most 
important puzzles in entrepreneurship literature being the apparent counter-cyclicality of 
business creation, as Bögenhold and Staber (1990)9 demonstrated a positive correlation 
between self-employment and unemployment across OECD countries, Fairlie and Fossen 
find that “opportunity” entrepreneurship is pro-cyclical and “necessity” entrepreneurship 
is countercyclical. Since necessity entrepreneurship is thought of as business creation in 
the face of limited alternative opportunities, this implies that the entrepreneur’s wage-
earning income is low. Given the downward wage rigidity in the labor market, the main 
                                               
9 As cited in Fairlie and Fossen 2017. 
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cause of low earnings in the wage and salary sector will more likely be through 
unemployment rather than a reduction in wages, so it makes sense to associate 
unemployment with necessity entrepreneurship. Fairlie and Fossen also show that 
“opportunity” entrepreneurship is associated with the creation of more growth-oriented 
businesses. 
Several other studies have also used business motivations to construct taxonomies 
of entrepreneurs. Some theorists talk about the distinction in terms of push and pull 
motivations: push motives tend to play more of a role for unemployed founders, pull 
motives for employed ones (Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans 1999)10. Expected job loss was one 
of the priority motives for unemployed founders, whereas employed founders tended to 
emphasize personal independence. Scase’s (1997) distinction between entrepreneurship 
and proprietorship is also analogous to the opportunity-necessity distinction. In even earlier 
literature, Cooper and Dunkelberg (1986)11 differentiate between the craftsman-
entrepreneur and manager-entrepreneur, where the former has a goal of self-realization and 
the latter concentrates on monetary and growth aims. 
Ultimately, one of the goals of constructing these motivation taxonomies is to better 
predict entrepreneurial outcomes in order to drive policy that encourages entrepreneurs to 
be the types that are more likely to succeed or drive economic growth. GEM reports 
indicate that opportunity entrepreneurship is correlated with higher growth, more 
innovative and niche-focused ventures, and a higher export-orientation (Reynolds et al. 
2002). In German GEM reports, opportunity entrepreneurs are said to have higher rates of 
survival and are characterized as “good entrepreneurship,” or the type that will contribute 
                                               
10 As cited in Smallbone and Welter 2003. 
11 As cited in Smallbone and Welter 2003. 
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to national economic development in the long run (Bergmann and Sternberg 2007). 
Necessity entrepreneurship is then viewed as a negative determinant of national growth 
and development. 
Smallbone and Welter (2003) examine the meaning and appropriateness of 
concepts of necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurship in early stage transition 
economies where market reform has been slow, so countries like Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus rather than Central and East European countries, where market reform is more 
advanced. Using survey data and case studies, they conclude that the main weakness of the 
dichotomous concepts of necessity and opportunity motivations is that expectations change 
over time as individuals learn, their capabilities change, and external conditions change. 
Particularly in the command-to-market transition context, economic necessity is 
undoubtedly a factor, and few people become entrepreneurs to respond to an identified 
market opportunity, although immediate push factors like unemployment are not dominant 
either. Rather, motivations operate at different times and levels, from deep-seated 
antecedent influences, to immediate triggers, to external conditions and personal 
circumstances that cause the terms “opportunity” and “choice” to be interpreted differently 
given the context. Moreover, low prevalence of high growth or “productive” 
entrepreneurship may be due more to institutional deficiencies rather than individual 
entrepreneurial motivations. 
With these many ways of categorizing entrepreneurial motivations and criticisms 
of the prevailing classification in mind, I ultimately still use GEM’s opportunity-necessity 
definition of motive in my analysis12. But, I do take into account the nuances of these 
                                               
12 Mostly because of data limitations, as I did not have access to initial employment status or detailed case 
studies of individual respondents.  
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definitions and criticisms, incorporating current work status into my interpretations and the 
way I code my opportunity entrepreneurship indicator13. 
C. Entrepreneurial Perceptions 
Van der Zwan et al. (2016) examine the determinants of being a necessity versus 
an opportunity entrepreneur, tying the motivation taxonomy to entrepreneurial perceptions. 
While their study finds socio-economic differences—opportunity entrepreneurs tend to be 
male, younger, wealthier, more proactive, and more optimistic—they do not find 
significant differences in entrepreneurial perceptions and other personality traits as 
determinants of entrepreneurial motivation. My contribution to this line of literature is to 
examine these characteristics in a country context to identify the cultural legacy effects; 
while there may not be universal personality and perception differences, there may be 
cultural context-specific ones.  
The effect of natural disasters on entrepreneurial actions and perceptions is studied 
by Monllor and Altay (2016). They find that natural disasters have a positive impact on 
entrepreneurial opportunity perceptions and actions, but not on perceptions of self-efficacy, 
fear of failure, or entrepreneurial intentions. They take these results as evidence of 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction theory, viewing natural disasters as disruptive processes 
that create an environment ripe for innovation and entrepreneurship. Results show a higher 
perception of entrepreneurial opportunity and more entrepreneurial action, specifically 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurial activity, reaffirming that this increase is not out of 
necessity or constraint. Although I am not looking at natural disasters specifically, Monllor 
                                               
13 See OPP2 in variable descriptions in the appendix. 
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and Altay’s analysis of entrepreneurial perceptions in response to an unpredictable, 
exogenous event may be relevant because a recession can also be seen as such an event. 
However, my analysis of CEE countries produces the opposite results, likely because 
Monllor and Altay only use pre-recession data from 2000 to 2007, and natural disasters 
tend to be locally confined whereas the Great Recession was felt globally. 
The novel contribution of this paper is to explore the intersection of these three 
sections: the post-socialist context, the opportunity-necessity motive distinction, and 
entrepreneurial perceptions as socio-cultural determinants.  
III. Data Description 
I primarily rely on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset 
to examine the relationships among entrepreneurial motivation, perception, country, and 
changes over time. The GEM Adult Population Survey (APS) measures attitudes toward 
entrepreneurship and prevalence of startup activity and business ownership in over 80 
countries from the general population of both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, with at 
least 2000 respondents per represented country per year surveyed. Surveys are conducted 
annually, but not consistently for every country (not every country has data for each year, 
and they are not conducted at regular intervals). The goal of GEM’s APS is to explore the 
role of the individual in the lifecycle of the entrepreneurial process, collecting data on 
socio-economic characteristics of populations as well as subjective perceptions of the 
entrepreneurial environment.  
This paper uses GEM data from the years 2003 through 2013 (the most recent and 
complete data that include the CEE countries of interest). By aggregating the years 2003 
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through 2013, my dataset includes over 1.5 million observations14 from the general 
population, of which approximately 100,000 are entrepreneurs. Other datasets used include 
The World Bank’s Doing Business Data, which evaluates the ease with which individuals 
can start and operate a business in each country using a ranking system, and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) Transition Report. Summary 
statistics are shown in Table 1, a country-level breakdown of summary statistics in Table 
2, and variable descriptions in the appendix. 
Caveats of the Data 
While entrepreneurship research has increased in specificity over recent years, its 
definition and conception and still very broad, although there has been consensus about its 
multidimensionality (Wennekers & Thurik 1999; Acs & Audretsch 2010)15. Szerb and 
Trumbull point out that GEM’s total early-stage entrepreneurial activity index (TEA), 
which measures the prevalence of entrepreneurship, “equates a Silicon Valley entrepreneur 
with a new Ugandan shepard or with a recently opened grocery shop in Thailand.” For this 
reason, I attempt to distinguish between different types of entrepreneurs by their 
entrepreneurial motive in order to add an additional degree of specificity to the analysis on 
entrepreneurship in a transition country context.  
Fear of failure and entrepreneurial motivation are both fairly subjective, nebulous 
concepts. GEM attempts to define these using the questions, “would fear of failure inhibit 
you from starting a business?” which assumes a hypothetical scenario, and “are you 
                                               
14 I should note that this data is not a panel dataset at the individual level; respondents in each country are 
not the same across years. At the country level, however, this data can function as an (unbalanced) panel by 
taking country-year averages. 
15 As cited in Szerb and Trumbull 2016. 
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involved in this start-up to take advantage of a business opportunity or because you have 
no better choices for work?” to assign a binary definition to each of fear of failure and 
entrepreneurial motivation. Critics point out the obvious subjectivity of these definitions, 
and that an individual’s answer may depend on the success of the business launch instead 
of pre-launch motivations or different language interpretations of the concepts of failure 
and necessity. 
While the GEM dataset is robust, it is so expansive that it would be very difficult 
to administer centrally the same number of surveys for every country in every consecutive 
year, so each country has a team that handles the data collection on its own. This means 
that in a given year, there may be 40,000 observations for one country, 2,000 for several 
others, and zero for the rest; and this is inconsistent across years. 
IV. Methodology 
 Because of the unbalanced time series nature of this data where only some countries 
are represented in some years, I am concerned about countries being consistently 
represented over time, especially when examining changes in time related to the recession. 
Since some countries are only represented in one or two years, it does not make sense to 
look at time trends for those countries, and they may potentially skew the data for particular 
years in which particular countries are overrepresented. Thus, I drop the countries that only 
appear in three or fewer years. The CEE countries represented in my refined dataset are: 
Hungary, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Croatia, and Slovenia (6 out of the 12 CEE countries). 
To make sure that this selection process does not skew my variables of interest in favor of 
more developed countries where accessibility of conducting representative surveys may be 
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greater, I compare the summary statistics of the original dataset to my reduced dataset in 
Table 2. It is worth noting that the overall averages of the reduced dataset do differ slightly 
from those of the original data: most dropped countries were African, South American, 
Asian, and Middle Eastern countries16; and the remaining countries have lower levels of 
entrepreneurship overall and less optimistic entrepreneurial perceptions17. This means that 
my reduced sample looks more like CEE countries, which may mean that differences could 
be understated.  
 The number of observations per country per year also presents an inconsistency 
problem. Most countries have around 2000 observations in a given year18, but some 
countries, like the UK, have absurdly high numbers of observations in some years (e.g. 
43,000 observations in 2006). I am concerned about the overrepresentation of these 
(Western and highly developed countries like the UK, Spain, and Switzerland), so I 
introduce weights in my analysis so that each country has approximately the same weight 
in any given year, and I also use cluster analysis by country. 
 Most of the variables I work with are binary indicators. Questions were asked as 
yes or no questions to individual respondents, so I coded “don’t know” or “refuse to 
answer” observations as missing. My variables of interest that indicate entrepreneurial 
perceptions were presented as self-assessment statements that respondents could choose to 
agree or disagree with: fear of failure (“fear of failure would prevent you from starting a 
new business,” coded as fearfail), opportunity perception (“in the next 6 months, there will 
                                               
16 In that order of most dropped. 
17 Looking back at the dropped African and South American countries, they do have substantially higher 
levels of entrepreneurship and optimistic perceptions. I do wonder how much this is due to skewed survey 
methodology (since most were one-off surveys) and different interpretations of entrepreneurship? 
18 And I cleaned the data so that none have fewer than 1600 observations in any given year. 
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be good opportunities to start a business,” coded as opport), self-efficacy (“you have the 
knowledge and skills to start a new business,” coded as suskill), and public opinion of 
entrepreneurs19.  
 Variables of interest that indicate entrepreneurial activity are: total entrepreneurial 
activity (is the individual currently a nascent entrepreneur? Coded as tea) and opportunity 
motivated entrepreneurship (“are you involved in this startup to take advantage of a 
business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?” Coded as teaopp)20. 
Other independent variables include country, a binary indicator for CEE21, year, and a 
binary indicator for post-recession years. Depending on the particular specification model, 
I control for gender, age, education, work status, and income. I also include country-year 
fixed effects when I am not interested in time-varying effects to control for general 
macroeconomic conditions that vary by country, by year.  
 The first question I ask is: do entrepreneurial perceptions and activity differ for 
CEE countries? I regress the CEE indicator on fear of failure, opportunity perception, self-
efficacy, public opinion, TEA, and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship with the 
following controls: 
yict= α + β1*CEEc  + β2*Yeart  +  β3*Educi + β4*Femalei + β5*Agei + β6*Age2i + β7*Worki 
+ β8*Incomei + εi   (Model A) 
                                               
19 This last public opinion entrepreneurial perception indicator is actually derived from three separate 
questions (“in your country, most people consider starting a new business a desirable career choice,” “in 
your country, those successful at starting a new business have a high level of status and respect,” “in your 
country, you will often see stories in the public media about successful new businesses”) that seem to 
measure the same sentiment and trended very similarly across countries and time, so I simply use the first 
question (coded as nbgoodc) to represent public opinion of entrepreneurs in general. 
20 See end of variable descriptions table for different versions of teaopp.  
21 I did also look at the country coefficients to confirm that individual CEE countries behaved similarly, not 
just one or two countries driving these effects. 
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Then, if CEE countries do have a systematically more pessimistic outlook in 
entrepreneurial perceptions from the model above, I ask if CEE countries are also less 
resilient in perceptions in the face of hardship. Does the 2008 recession have a differential 
effect on entrepreneurial perceptions in CEE countries? I interact the recession indicator 
with the CEE indicator as shown in the following equation:  
yict= α + β1*CEEc  + β2*PostRect  +  β3*CEEc*PostRect  + β4*Educi + β5*Femalei + 
β6*Agei + β7*Worki + β8*Incomei + εi   (Model B)22 
where y takes on the values of fear of failure, opportunity perception, self-efficacy, public 
opinion, TEA, and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship.   
The purpose of examining entrepreneurial perceptions is not just for its own sake, 
but because we assume that entrepreneurial perceptions (fear of failure, opportunity 
perception, and self-efficacy) actually affect entrepreneurial actions (total entrepreneurial 
activity and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship). For this reason, I run a fundamental 
assumptions check to confirm that this is true with the following equation:  
yict= α + β1*FearFailc  + β2*Opportc  +  β3*Suskillc  + β4*Educi + β5*Femalei + β6*Agei + 
β7*Countryc*Yeart + εi   (Model C) 
where y is tea and teaopp. I control for the usual individual level controls except work 
status and income because those are highly correlated with tea and teaopp, and I use 
country-year fixed effects to absorb macroeconomic conditions.  
 Finally, after establishing that entrepreneurial perceptions do in fact affect 
entrepreneurial activity, I ask whether these perceptions have a differential effect on 
                                               
22 For all following regressions, I leave out Age2 because it does not change the results by much.  
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activity for CEE countries. I use the following equation that simply adds CEE interaction 
terms with each of the entrepreneurial perception indicators to Model C: 
yict= α + β1*FearFailc  + β2*Opportc  +  β3*Suskillc  + β4*Educi + β5*Femalei + β6*Agei + 
β7*Countryc*Yeart + β8*FearFailc*CEEc  + β9*Opportc*CEEc  + β10*Suskillc*CEEc  + εi  
(Model D) 
V. Results and Discussion 
A. Entrepreneurial Perceptions and Activity 
The regression results for Model A are summarized in Table 3. With high degrees 
of significance, fear of failure and opportunity perception do differ for CEE countries. 
Being in a CEE country increases the likelihood of fear of failure preventing someone from 
starting a business by 5%, significant with a p-value of 0.02. Fear of failure can also be 
interpreted as risk aversion, so those in CEE countries are on average more risk averse. The 
controls in this first regression in Column 1 also make sense: being female increases risk 
aversion, being retired or in school reduces risk aversion because presumably the pressure 
to maintain a stable income is off, and being in the top third of the income distribution also 
reduces risk aversion because one likely has some degree of a financial cushion. There 
does not seem to be an obvious correlation, however, between education level and risk 
aversion. 
 Being in a CEE country decreases the likelihood of a perceived business 
opportunity by 14%, and this is especially significant with a p-value of 0.001. The time 
fixed effects seem consistent with 2008 recession trends: opportunity perception increases 
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from 2003-2007, reaches a maximum, drops in 2008-2009, and slowly recovers thereafter. 
Being female and being of older age both reduce opportunity perception because these 
demographic groups do have more constrained access to opportunities. Being unemployed 
has the most negative effect on opportunity perception, and being a student or retired also 
has a negative effect compared to employed respondents who presumably see the most 
opportunities as active members of the workforce. 
However, the CEE indicator is insignificant for self-efficacy (skill self-perception) 
and public opinion of entrepreneurs (nbgoodc, nbstatus, nbmedia)23. There does not appear 
to be a measurable difference in how entrepreneurs are perceived and how qualified people 
feel to be entrepreneurs in CEE countries24, 25. This might be explained by the idea of an 
external locus of control as part of Communism’s legacy: less optimistic perceptions in 
CEE countries may not be due to individual ownership of problems in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem (i.e. “I have lower relative skills”), but a generalized lack of agency due to the 
external environment (e.g. fear of failure, lack of opportunity). Figure 1 illustrates the 
relative average self-efficacy compared to relative opportunity perception by country, and 
we can observe that CEE countries are grouped approximately in the middle for average 
self-efficacy, whereas they are grouped on the lower end of opportunity perception.  
The controls for self-efficacy and public opinion are significant in ways that make 
sense intuitively, so there is further reason to believe the insignificance of the CEE 
                                               
23 Although I only list nbgoodc in Table 4 because all of the nb* variables produce approximately the same 
results. 
24 I also tested if there are differences along gender or other dimensions (i.e. CEE interacted with female, 
etc.), and there are no significant differences with these specifications either. 
25 Again, as a sanity check, the controls make sense: females have lower self-perceived skill, unemployed 
and retired/students have lower self-perceived skill, and higher income has greater likelihood to perceive 
skill. Although, one would think that a higher level of education is correlated with more skill perception, 
and it turns out that work status and income absorb most of this effect, which is only significant for grad 
school (more likely to perceive skill) when I tested this without work status and income. 
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indicator is not just due to noise. Male, older, working, and wealthier respondents are more 
likely to believe they have the skills to start a business26. Older and more highly educated 
respondents are less likely to think their country views entrepreneurship as a desirable 
career choice, which makes sense because opportunity cost is much higher for these 
demographics, and they are more likely to operate in social circles with more traditional or 
conventional notions of success. Those who are not working (unemployed and 
retired/student categories) are slightly more likely to view entrepreneurship as desirable, 
again because they have a lower opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur27. 
Columns 5 and 6 show that one is significantly less likely to be an entrepreneur or 
choose opportunity entrepreneurship in CEE countries, which is consistent with the 
literature on the lower overall levels of entrepreneurship and higher prevalence of necessity 
entrepreneurship in these countries (Scase 1997; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008; Szerb 
and Trumbull 2016). 
B. Entrepreneurial Perceptions, Activity, and Post-Recession Time 
Trends 
Given the overall more pessimistic outlook of CEE countries in entrepreneurial 
perceptions from the subsection above, are there time trends that drive shifts in these 
pessimistic attitudes? The results summarized in Table 4.1 show that the 2008 recession 
does seem to have a differential effect on entrepreneurial perceptions in CEE countries, 
                                               
26 Interestingly enough, education is not significantly correlated with self-efficacy in these results. One 
would think that they would be positively correlated, but it could be that the reference group changes as 
education increases, so people perceive their own skills relative to the people around them.  
27 Also interestingly, whereas females have much lower self-efficacy on average, there is no significant 
difference in their view of public opinion of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is just as desirable and 
externally validated for females, but they feel like they do not have the requisite personal ability; females 
appear to view themselves differently than they do public perceptions. 
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which may be evidence that entrepreneurship is less enduring and resilient in times of 
economic hardship in CEE countries. 
 Column 1 shows that fear of failure increases significantly for all countries post-
recession, but to a much greater degree for CEE countries. For other countries, fear of 
failure increases by 5% post-recession; for CEE countries, almost 15%—the effect for CEE 
countries is almost three times as large as it is for other countries. In Column 2, opportunity 
perception also has a differential effect for CEE countries, as it is significantly lower in 
CEE post-recession. It appears that most of the significant difference in opportunity 
perception and fear of failure is due to the post-recession difference for CEE countries, 
with pre-recession CEE having no significant differences. Self-efficacy (Column 3) drops 
after the recession for non-CEE countries, but it does not seem to have a measurable effect 
in CEE countries, reaffirming the external locus of control hypothesis from the previous 
section. Whereas economic hardships due to the recession seem to be internalized in other 
countries as a personal failure of lacking skill, CEE countries seem to blame lacking 
external opportunities. 
 Figure 2 highlights these time trends for opportunity perception and fear of failure 
for CEE countries. Opportunity perception seems to increase for countries in CEE in 2005 
after the Visegrad Group joined the European Union in 2004, and then it drops drastically 
in 2008-2009 after the recession. There is a much greater shock to opportunity perception 
in CEE countries on average, and they have not yet recovered to 2007 levels of optimism 
about business opportunities, whereas non-CEE countries returned to 2007 levels by 2010. 
Fear of failure has also increased drastically since 2008 for CEE countries, whereas the 
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increase is much slighter for non-CEE countries. This suggests that there may be less 
“resilience” in optimism regarding entrepreneurship in these countries. 
Post-recession years also have a positive effect on entrepreneurship for all 
countries, and to a significantly greater degree for CEE countries as seen in Table 4.2. This 
is an added nuance to existing literature that merely warns us of lower levels of 
entrepreneurship in CEE countries—actually, the negative effect of the CEE indicator on 
entrepreneurship seems to be mostly pre-recession. Rates of entrepreneurship for CEE and 
non-CEE countries are converging over time, with less of a differential post-recession, as 
evidenced in Figure 3. But, it seems like most of that increase in entrepreneurship in CEE 
countries is necessity-motivated rather than opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship, as the 
interaction term between the CEE and post-recession indicators has a negative effect on 
opportunity entrepreneurship. Figure 4 visually depicts this as well; whereas the share of 
both necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs in CEE countries increases over time, 
necessity entrepreneurship increases much more drastically. This fits in with Fairlie and 
Fossen’s findings that necessity entrepreneurship increases after an economic downturn, 
whereas opportunity is associated with expansions. 
C. Effect of Entrepreneurial Perceptions on Entrepreneurial 
Activity  
The results of Model C’s regression in Table 5 confirm that perceptions do matter 
for entrepreneurial actions. Column 1 in Table 5 indicates that self-efficacy (suskill) has 
the strongest effect on total entrepreneurial activity and is the greatest determinant in this 
model by a substantial margin (coefficient of 0.12), followed by opportunity perception 
(coefficient of 0.06), and then fear of failure (coefficient of -0.03), all of which are hugely 
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significant. Once again as a sanity check, the controls behave as we expect them to: college 
and beyond makes a person more likely to be an entrepreneur, whereas female and older 
age make someone less likely to be an entrepreneur. 
 In Column 4, we examine the opportunity versus necessity entrepreneurship 
distinction. Looking only at the subset of entrepreneurs, this specification follows the 
previous literature in attempting to distinguish differing characteristics between necessity 
and opportunity entrepreneurs; it should not be interpreted as the effect of certain 
entrepreneurial perceptions on an individual’s choice to pursue opportunity or necessity-
motivated entrepreneurship (presumably because they do not have have a choice if it is 
necessity-motivated). This model looks within entrepreneurs to determine who is a willing 
entrepreneur and who is merely out of luck in the labor market. It appears that all of the 
explanatory variables affect opportunity entrepreneurship in the same way that they do total 
entrepreneurial activity: those with lower fear of failure, higher opportunity perception, 
and higher self-efficacy are more likely to be willing entrepreneurs. Opportunity perception 
is the greatest determinant here (with a coefficient of 0.07), which seems obvious given the 
shared “opportunity” in the variable names. What is interesting to note, however, is that 
self-efficacy (coefficient of 0.05) is a much smaller determinant of opportunity 
entrepreneurship—this suggests that necessity entrepreneurs need a substantial degree of 
self-efficacy as well, as it is not particularly unique to opportunity entrepreneurship but 
remains the largest determinant of entrepreneurship overall. 
 Finally, after having established that entrepreneurial perceptions do actually affect 
entrepreneurial activity and motivations, and that there may be policy implications 
especially since the shift in perceptions is largely post-recession, I examine the differential 
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effect on activity for CEE countries in Model D. The regression results produced in Column 
1 of Table 6 show a significantly negative interaction term between the CEE indicator and 
opportunity perception, which suggests that the presence of a perceived opportunity in CEE 
countries is less likely to be associated with overall entrepreneurship than in non-CEE 
countries. In context, this has a rational interpretation: given higher conditions of constraint 
and lower levels of trust in post-socialist countries, there is a higher threshold for a 
perceived opportunity to become a business reality. Fear of failure and self-efficacy do not 
seem to be differential in terms of how they impact overall entrepreneurship. 
In Column 2, while that same interaction effect between CEE and opportunity 
perception is not significant for opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship, the interaction 
term between CEE and suskill is, which means that self-efficacy is less likely to be 
associated with opportunity entrepreneurship in CEE countries than non-CEE countries. 
This higher threshold for self-efficacy for opportunity entrepreneurs again makes sense 
because, with “tougher” conditions, one must be more confident in one’s own skills to 
survive in the entrepreneurial environment. Column 3 shows us that self-efficacy actually 
has a positive differential effect for necessity entrepreneurship in CEE countries, meaning 
that those with higher self-efficacy are more likely to be necessity entrepreneurs in CEE 
countries, which again reaffirms the higher prevalence of necessity entrepreneurship in 
these countries.  
The fourth specification in Column 4 that looks only at the subset of entrepreneurs, 
as noted above, is not causal. Given that you already are an entrepreneur, you do not get to 
choose whether it is by necessity or opportunity, so entrepreneurial perceptions here again 
do not have a causal effect on entrepreneurial motivation. But, simply looking at 
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distinctions between necessity and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship, this does seem 
to indicate that opportunity-motivation in CEE countries is even more correlated with 
lower fear of failure, substantially greater opportunity perception, but lower skill self-
perception than in non-CEE countries, although the link between suskill and teaopp is still 
not negative because the coefficient on the interaction term is not enough to overturn the 
suskill coefficient.  
VI. Conclusion 
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) CEE countries have 
more pessimistic entrepreneurial perceptions, and these differences are driven by post-
recession effects, 2) CEE countries have lower levels of entrepreneurship and share of 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship (relative to necessity entrepreneurship), 3) 
entrepreneurial perceptions do in fact affect entrepreneurial actions and motivations, and 
4) opportunity perception has a diminished positive effect on entrepreneurial activity in 
CEE countries, suggesting a higher threshold for a perceived opportunity to become a 
business reality in these countries. 
These results do evidence, although they cannot prove (as there are infinitely many 
other factors at play), the cultural legacy of Communism. Despite the formal and prompt 
transitions to market economies, accession to the European Union, and presence of legal, 
financial, and educational institutions supportive of entrepreneurship in these post-socialist 
countries, the generational transfer of informal institutions like norms and values seem to 
be inescapable. A generalized lack of trust and external locus of control are plausible 
lingering sentiments because of the lower levels of risk-tolerance and opportunity 
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perception compared to ordinary levels of self-efficacy and public opinion of entrepreneurs 
in CEE countries. 
The policy implications are substantial, particularly because of the post-recession 
trends. If there is indeed less resilience during economic shocks in CEE countries as shown 
by the dominating increase in negative entrepreneurial perceptions and necessity-
motivated entrepreneurship, increased entrepreneurial support during economic downturns 
rather than a one-size-fits-all strategy may be more effective. Entrepreneurial education 
does not seem to be significantly lacking in CEE countries, evidenced by the lack of 
difference in self-skill perception between CEE and non-CEE countries, but there could be 
a benefit to teaching the importance of failure (in order to normalize it) and opportunity 
recognition, not just skills to succeed. 
 The opportunities for future research in this area are plenty. To put more of an 
international relations context28 into this economics paper, I will look more closely at some 
of the macro-level political factors that I touched on in the introduction and incorporate 
indicators for those into the analysis. The increasingly conservative political climate in 
countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic sets up what some would argue to be a 
hostile environment for entrepreneurship. One could also incorporate World Bank data on 
economic development levels (or speed of development, GDP growth, etc.) into a country-
level analysis to see how countries at similar levels of development compare in their 
entrepreneurial perceptions and activity. Looking at “non-CEE” countries with more 
specificity would also add depth to this analysis: how does CEE compare to the rest of the 
                                               
28 Which I intend to do next semester, in the spring of 2018, for a research fellowship from the Keck Center 
for International and Strategic Studies at CMC.  
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EU? All Western countries? Other formerly communist-countries like the former Soviet 
Union and Asian countries?  
 To take this analysis a step further, one could also examine not just entrepreneurial 
perceptions, which affect entrepreneurial activity, but also entrepreneurial outcomes. Are 
there differences in firm performance or dropout rates? The share of “gazelles”29 or high-
impact entrepreneurs? 
 I also hope to supplement this data-driven analysis with fieldwork and case 
studies30. More qualitative data could shed light on the “why” behind the conclusions from 
this paper, as well as what these differences look like in practice for entrepreneurs in 
Eastern Europe. Because qualitative data requires much more context for understanding, it 
would make sense to zoom in on a particular country and its entrepreneurs and cultural 
history.  
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VIII. Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for GEM 2003-2013 Data. 
 
  N mean sd min max 
age 1,412,830 42.24 15.36 9 100 
female 1,446,831 0.529 0.499 0 1 
opport 1,003,211 0.384 0.486 0 1 
suskill 1,151,547 0.483 0.5 0 1 
fearfail 1,149,396 0.373 0.484 0 1 
nbgoodc 1,041,099 0.639 0.48 0 1 
nbstatus 1,056,423 0.693 0.461 0 1 
nbmedia 1,069,999 0.595 0.491 0 1 
work status 1,413,228 15.78 8.001 10 30 
educ 1,405,885 963.5 587.4 0 1,720 
income 971,340 24,656 31,522 33 68,100 
tea 1,447,053 0.088 0.283 0 1 
opp 177,843 0.653 0.476 0 1 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (mean) for Reduced Dataset (years present > 3) 
 
 age knowent opport suskill fearfail nbgoodc nbstatus nbmedia work educ income female tea teaopp 
US 51.27 0.298 0.360 0.562 0.281 0.606 0.671 0.659 17.22 1251 24017 0.518 0.088 0.059 
Russia 39.87 0.353 0.226 0.267 0.484 0.605 0.619 0.477 15.17 1289 28215 0.546 0.042 0.023 
Egypt 37.52 0.428 0.454 0.621 0.335 0.781 0.867 0.642 15.65 846 21551 0.485 0.094 0.049 
South Africa 37.98 0.334 0.346 0.408 0.286 0.683 0.679 0.680 19.63 610 31598 0.503 0.061 0.032 
Greece 40.65 0.356 0.200 0.541 0.609 0.658 0.697 0.385 15.49 1070 25660 0.512 0.068 0.037 
Netherlands 50.60 0.300 0.375 0.409 0.296 0.822 0.670 0.603 16.96 1118 28893 0.562 0.051 0.034 
Belgium 43.11 0.285 0.300 0.405 0.341 0.588 0.574 0.438 15.61 1145 26989 0.534 0.035 0.023 
France 47.52 0.361 0.267 0.320 0.440 0.617 0.678 0.422 16.99 1006 22487 0.528 0.036 0.024 
Spain 42.17 0.324 0.236 0.490 0.492 0.655 0.597 0.433 14.90 838 26164 0.502 0.055 0.033 
Hungary 40.22 0.310 0.174 0.404 0.376 0.488 0.668 0.303 15.29 809 27081 0.508 0.064 0.034 
Italy 44.82 0.295 0.250 0.384 0.457 0.693 0.678 0.443 17.30 930 19838 0.524 0.034 0.020 
Romania 46.50 0.316 0.261 0.323 0.448 0.670 0.676 0.536 18.61 948 22672 0.527 0.053 0.026 
Switzerland 45.50 0.336 0.384 0.474 0.332 0.530 0.720 0.553 15.68 972 23765 0.526 0.057 0.037 
Austria 41.14 0.411 0.468 0.522 0.434 0.436 0.740 0.568 14.10 883 21239 0.511 0.068 0.037 
UK 47.29 0.246 0.330 0.483 0.339 0.515 0.734 0.546 15.65 1102 15085 0.587 0.045 0.027 
Denmark 41.73 0.441 0.584 0.392 0.387 0.508 0.736 0.351 13.97 1322 20129 0.527 0.050 0.036 
Sweden 43.45 0.438 0.452 0.414 0.351 0.542 0.637 0.572 14.65 819 24958 0.496 0.036 0.026 
Norway 46.28 0.376 0.509 0.405 0.282 0.568 0.703 0.669 15.94 1233 28097 0.512 0.062 0.048 
Poland 40.26 0.446 0.277 0.562 0.593 0.665 0.575 0.510 15.41 1188 25460 0.516 0.091 0.042 
Germany 43.61 0.358 0.294 0.460 0.437 0.505 0.759 0.490 14.60 919 24017 0.526 0.054 0.033 
Peru 35.38 0.566 0.642 0.744 0.322 0.819 0.753 0.783 15.02 846 23028 0.515 0.272 0.168 
Mexico 36.66 0.484 0.459 0.585 0.321 0.591 0.590 0.501 15.86 752 24878 0.511 0.105 0.060 
Argentina 43.16 0.365 0.506 0.619 0.309 0.718 0.686 0.727 16.80 955 24401 0.538 0.135 0.068 
Brazil 37.31 0.383 0.486 0.551 0.387 0.832 0.818 0.814 15.12 641 21258 0.521 0.148 0.085 
Chile 43.01 0.426 0.584 0.610 0.317 0.781 0.704 0.599 15.92 1011 28218 0.545 0.163 0.100 
Colombia 37.93 0.342 0.697 0.613 0.323 0.895 0.753 0.690 14.63 934 28648 0.527 0.202 0.125 
Malaysia 39.60 0.483 0.395 0.329 0.395 0.514 0.565 0.727 14.66 742 28224 0.415 0.066 0.044 
Australia 47.96 0.345 0.482 0.539 0.355 0.539 0.682 0.647 16.20 1001 28208 0.590 0.086 0.059 
Singapore 39.70 0.256 0.203 0.295 0.387 0.509 0.587 0.710 14.78 1056 26134 0.499 0.068 0.048 
Thailand 40.05 0.351 0.365 0.433 0.560 0.804 0.784 0.830 14.01 813 25325 0.551 0.172 0.111 
Japan 43.76 0.221 0.088 0.153 0.354 0.301 0.514 0.568 14.33 1269 21224 0.515 0.032 0.021 
Korea 39.73 0.339 0.134 0.315 0.387 0.613 0.688 0.649 16.01 1155 25792 0.494 0.074 0.037 
China 38.51 0.565 0.336 0.392 0.319 0.709 0.744 0.787 14.06 778 25576 0.519 0.151 0.069 
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Turkey 37.93 0.352 0.378 0.520 0.332 0.717 0.790 0.614 17.66 834 19940 0.535 0.070 0.035 
India 36.06 0.519 0.469 0.595 0.355 0.679 0.806 0.787 15.12 952 16166 0.394 0.093 0.055 
Iran 34.87 0.443 0.372 0.607 0.344 0.617 0.805 0.604 17.87 832 26747 0.455 0.103 0.049 
Canada 45.38 0.349 0.434 0.537 0.252 0.734 0.690 0.759 15.95 1192 10139 0.562 0.067 0.050 
Uganda 33.22 0.677 0.758 0.861 0.249 0.828 0.858 0.791 15.36 320 21696 0.545 0.323 0.150 
Portugal 39.56 0.336 0.228 0.535 0.439 0.664 0.687 0.501 14.42 675 29674 0.503 0.067 0.044 
Ireland 43.76 0.388 0.357 0.503 0.365 0.581 0.813 0.721 15.04 1142 21615 0.565 0.068 0.042 
Iceland 42.16 0.641 0.549 0.534 0.365 0.610 0.676 0.787 13.34 902 28388 0.524 0.107 0.075 
Finland 42.13 0.483 0.498 0.409 0.335 0.419 0.857 0.696 14.57 1025 23681 0.497 0.052 0.033 
Latvia 40.94 0.433 0.320 0.426 0.396 0.611 0.679 0.620 14.59 1156 24848 0.537 0.079 0.047 
Croatia 45.44 0.422 0.318 0.550 0.378 0.681 0.498 0.502 19.06 790 23208 0.551 0.055 0.028 
Slovenia 41.19 0.485 0.337 0.511 0.324 0.540 0.729 0.577 16.75 969 21263 0.523 0.044 0.031 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 43.25 0.384 0.323 0.593 0.343 0.782 0.651 0.475 18.49 997 26372 0.520 0.065 0.022 
Venezuela 38.50 0.520 0.556 0.755 0.287 0.808 0.741 0.504 14.99 799 23039 0.547 0.219 0.117 
Ecuador 38.09 0.412 0.497 0.751 0.366 0.824 0.754 0.637 14.79 710 29561 0.542 0.212 0.122 
Uruguay 45.73 0.379 0.491 0.625 0.315 0.667 0.700 0.582 16.94 725 25716 0.566 0.101 0.058 
Hong Kong 42.09 0.336 0.370 0.275 0.367 0.583 0.658 0.703 17.07 699 26697 0.542 0.043 0.026 
Jamaica 38.07 0.520 0.548 0.796 0.290 0.813 0.821 0.759 13.48 641 23560 0.535 0.217 0.107 
Israel 40.74 0.361 0.305 0.391 0.428 0.589 0.708 0.506 15.72 1239 22616 0.529 0.055 0.032 
Reduced 
dataset mean 41.60 0.396 0.389 0.496 0.371 0.644 0.701 0.605 15.72 939 24303 0.522 0.093 0.054 
Original 
expanded 
dataset mean 39.73 0.438 0.440 0.558 0.353 0.688 0.724 0.631 15.57 883 25067 0.520 0.124 0.071 
CEE mean 42.43 0.402 0.281 0.463 0.419 0.6092 0.638 0.508 16.62 977 24089 0.527 0.064 0.035 
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Table 3. Do entrepreneurial perceptions and activity differ for CEE countries? Linear regressions.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES fearfail opport suskill nbgoodc tea teaopp2 
       
CEE 0.0512** -0.137*** -0.0317 -0.0437 -0.0277*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0377) (0.0416) (0.0428) (0.00998) (0.00666) 
2004.year 0.0758*** 0.114*** 0.0782*** 0.187*** 0.0293*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.00279) (0.00466) (0.00396) (0.00332) (0.00126) (0.000735) 
2005.year -0.122*** 0.281*** 0.241*** 0.125*** 0.0523*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0275) (0.00861) (0.00607) 
2006.year -0.106*** 0.310*** 0.262*** 0.167*** 0.0666*** 0.0448*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0300) (0.0265) (0.0243) (0.0119) (0.00860) 
2007.year -0.104*** 0.347*** 0.258*** 0.181*** 0.0673*** 0.0417*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0322) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0105) (0.00601) 
2008.year -0.0852*** 0.287*** 0.267*** 0.190*** 0.0640*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0267) (0.0271) (0.0230) (0.00834) (0.00519) 
2009.year -0.0887*** 0.253*** 0.290*** 0.161*** 0.0704*** 0.0425*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0258) (0.0282) (0.0243) (0.00942) (0.00658) 
2010.year -0.0623*** 0.281*** 0.249*** 0.173*** 0.0639*** 0.0357*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0279) (0.0255) (0.0201) (0.00968) (0.00651) 
2011.year 0.000616 0.296*** 0.185*** 0.169*** 0.0725*** 0.0497*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0370) (0.0283) (0.0343) (0.0114) (0.00828) 
2012.year -0.0275* 0.268*** 0.200*** 0.149*** 0.0814*** 0.0537*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0272) (0.0239) (0.0228) (0.0100) (0.00732) 
2013.year -0.00980 0.258*** 0.166*** 0.125*** 0.0755*** 0.0526*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0328) (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0100) (0.00865) 
educ = some HS 0.00759 -0.0570*** -0.00517 -0.0507*** -0.0235*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0154) (0.00871) (0.00750) 
educ = HS grad -0.00896 -0.0627** 0.000433 -0.0849*** -0.0351** -0.0255** 
 (0.0162) (0.0300) (0.0322) (0.0232) (0.0137) (0.0106) 
educ = college -0.00835 -0.0666* 0.0117 -0.150*** -0.0364** -0.0217* 
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 (0.0166) (0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0272) (0.0154) (0.0114) 
educ = grad school -0.00599 -0.0319 0.0422 -0.185*** -0.0379** -0.0187 
 (0.0206) (0.0367) (0.0389) (0.0266) (0.0150) (0.0115) 
female 0.0653*** -0.0383*** -0.129*** -0.00162 -0.0232*** -0.0204*** 
 (0.00517) (0.00655) (0.0109) (0.00563) (0.00414) (0.00280) 
age 0.00878*** -0.00730*** 0.00571*** -0.00718*** -0.00209*** -0.00245*** 
 (0.00103) (0.00157) (0.00146) (0.00123) (0.000652) (0.000432) 
age2 -0.000106*** 5.75e-05*** -7.23e-05*** 6.48e-05*** 7.57e-06 1.53e-05*** 
 (1.11e-05) (1.77e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.57e-05) (5.86e-06) (3.71e-06) 
not working 0.0156* -0.0545*** -0.0565*** 0.0216** -0.0698*** – 
 (0.00795) (0.0103) (0.0112) (0.00969) (0.0107) – 
retired/student -0.0125* -0.0509*** -0.134*** -0.00174 -0.0870*** -0.0524*** 
 (0.00731) (0.0102) (0.0117) (0.00788) (0.00894) (0.00575) 
inc = middle 33%tile -0.0102 0.0241*** 0.0388*** 0.00231 0.000244 0.00441* 
 (0.00793) (0.00887) (0.00626) (0.00706) (0.00236) (0.00221) 
inc = upper 33%tile -0.0453*** 0.0717*** 0.0928*** -0.00339 0.0195*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.00641) (0.0112) (0.00990) (0.00978) (0.00411) (0.00397) 
Constant 0.271*** 0.379*** 0.211*** 0.762*** 0.166*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0556) (0.0581) (0.0323) (0.0304) (0.0206) 
       
Observations 753,410 659,205 753,563 682,108 919,311 721,786 
R-squared 0.019 0.029 0.057 0.019 0.033 0.024 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.1. Do entrepreneurial perceptions differ for CEE countries to a different degree 
post-recession? Linear regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES fearfail opport suskill nbgoodc 
1.CEE -0.00521 -0.0831 -0.0613 -0.0448 
 (0.0248) (0.0532) (0.0653) (0.0470) 
1.postrec 0.0531*** -0.0225 -0.0462** -0.0116 
 (0.0125) (0.0241) (0.0180) (0.0151) 
1.CEE#1.postrec 0.0934** -0.0829* 0.0542 -0.000337 
 (0.0361) (0.0457) (0.0522) (0.0411) 
educ = some HS 0.00940 -0.0566*** -0.0119 -0.0560*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0196) (0.0211) (0.0150) 
educ = HS grad -0.00746 -0.0592* -0.00897 -0.0863*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0302) (0.0341) (0.0229) 
educ = college -0.00203 -0.0649* 0.00145 -0.154*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0350) (0.0403) (0.0269) 
educ = grad school 0.000957 -0.0291 0.0273 -0.189*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0373) (0.0401) (0.0258) 
female 0.0672*** -0.0392*** -0.128*** -0.00286 
 (0.00532) (0.00656) (0.0109) (0.00555) 
age -0.000466 -0.00230*** -0.000603 -0.00155*** 
 (0.000343) (0.000411) (0.000511) (0.000389) 
not working 0.00925 -0.0522*** -0.0576*** 0.0258** 
 (0.00821) (0.0104) (0.0115) (0.00989) 
retired/student -0.0467*** -0.0333*** -0.157*** 0.0207** 
 (0.00743) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.00930) 
inc = middle 
33%tile 
-0.00658 0.0200** 0.0418*** 0.00176 
 (0.00869) (0.00899) (0.00711) (0.00689) 
inc = upper 33%tile -0.0436*** 0.0682*** 0.104*** -0.00209 
 (0.00640) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00918) 
Constant 0.355*** 0.578*** 0.600*** 0.820*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0472) (0.0518) (0.0328) 
     
Observations 753,410 659,205 753,563 682,108 
R-squared 0.014 0.025 0.051 0.016 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2 Do entrepreneurial activity and motivations differ for CEE countries to a 
different degree post-recession? Linear regressions. 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES tea teaopp2 teanec teaopp if tea = 1 
1.CEE -0.0354*** -0.0234*** -0.00962** -0.0197 
 (0.00945) (0.00568) (0.00416) (0.0312) 
1.postrec 0.0133** 0.0107** 0.00330* -0.000372 
 (0.00505) (0.00451) (0.00171) (0.0174) 
1.CEE#1.postrec 0.0154** 0.00318 0.00835** -0.0864*** 
 (0.00742) (0.00555) (0.00318) (0.0223) 
educ = some HS -0.0156* -0.0158** -0.0115** 0.0173 
 (0.00898) (0.00754) (0.00530) (0.0115) 
educ = HS grad -0.0234 -0.0155 -0.0222*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0105) (0.00820) (0.0143) 
educ = college -0.0136 -0.00430 -0.0277*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0112) (0.00894) (0.0152) 
educ = grad 
school 
-0.00333 0.00667 -0.0300*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0111) (0.00877) (0.0174) 
female -0.0367*** -0.0253*** -0.00410*** -0.0658*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00248) (0.00106) (0.00806) 
age -0.00167*** -0.00125*** -0.000416*** -0.00274*** 
 (0.000224) (0.000155) (9.87e-05) (0.000438) 
Work status FE – – – – 
Income FE – – – – 
Constant 0.190*** 0.131*** 0.0617*** 0.593*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0171) (0.0129) (0.0279) 
     
Observations 1,372,987 1,073,429 1,372,987 108,100 
R-squared 0.015 0.013 0.005 0.040 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. Do entrepreneurial perceptions affect entrepreneurial activity? Linear 
regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES tea teaopp2 teanec teaopp if tea=1 
     
fearfail -0.0275*** -0.0254*** 0.000316 -0.0530*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.000564) (0.00588) 
opport 0.0553*** -0.00378 -0.00441 0.0717*** 
 (0.00332) (0.00369) (0.00274) (0.00475) 
suskill 0.117*** 0.00415 -0.0102*** 0.0555*** 
 (0.00498) (0.00439) (0.00353) (0.00723) 
educ = some HS 0.00109 0.0166*** -0.0164*** 0.0342** 
 (0.00392) (0.00490) (0.00412) (0.0158) 
educ = HS grad 0.00740 0.0229*** -0.0220*** 0.116*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00526) (0.00472) (0.0182) 
educ = college 0.0192*** -0.0120*** -0.000400 0.189*** 
 (0.00496) (0.00259) (0.00129) (0.0199) 
educ = grad school 0.0224*** -0.00103*** -0.000159*** 0.240*** 
 (0.00527) (9.86e-05) (4.89e-05) (0.0216) 
female -0.0206*** 0.0463*** 0.00568*** -0.0565*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00309) (0.000900) (0.00715) 
age -0.00119*** 0.0868*** 0.0252*** -0.00314*** 
 (0.000120) (0.00434) (0.00234) (0.000399) 
country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0937*** 0.0669*** 0.0317*** 0.530*** 
 (0.00768) (0.00632) (0.00423) (0.0272) 
     
Observations 912,105 705,963 912,105 92,648 
R-squared 0.113 0.092 0.038 0.091 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 39 
Table 6. Do entrepreneurial perceptions affect entrepreneurial activity differently for 
CEE countries? Linear regressions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES tea teaopp2 teanec teaopp if tea=1 
     
fearfail -0.0276*** -0.0251*** 0.000228 -0.0483*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00200) (0.000574) (0.00575) 
opport 0.0565*** 0.0468*** 0.00624*** 0.0665*** 
 (0.00363) (0.00343) (0.000956) (0.00459) 
suskill 0.117*** 0.0889*** 0.0238*** 0.0596*** 
 (0.00555) (0.00482) (0.00248) (0.00741) 
educ = some 
HS 
0.00106 -0.00382 -0.00440 0.0343** 
 (0.00392) (0.00370) (0.00273) (0.0158) 
educ = HS 
grad 
0.00737 0.00419 -0.0102*** 0.116*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00440) (0.00351) (0.0182) 
educ = college 0.0192*** 0.0168*** -0.0165*** 0.190*** 
 (0.00497) (0.00491) (0.00409) (0.0199) 
educ = grad 
school 
0.0224*** 0.0231*** -0.0221*** 0.240*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00528) (0.00469) (0.0215) 
female -0.0206*** -0.0120*** -0.000376 -0.0566*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00259) (0.00129) (0.00714) 
age -0.00119*** -0.00103*** -0.000158*** -0.00313*** 
 (0.000120) (9.88e-05) (4.88e-05) (0.000399) 
fearfail#CEE 4.67e-05 -0.00160 0.000187 -0.0497** 
 (0.00413) (0.00286) (0.00193) (0.0205) 
opport#CEE -0.0125*** -0.00529 -0.00487*** 0.0572*** 
 (0.00416) (0.00418) (0.00108) (0.0125) 
suskill#CEE -0.00120 -0.0172** 0.0110** -0.0448** 
 (0.00948) (0.00738) (0.00510) (0.0217) 
country-year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0937*** 0.0669*** 0.0317*** 0.530*** 
 (0.00767) (0.00632) (0.00417) (0.0271) 
     
Observations 912,105 705,963 912,105 92,648 
R-squared 0.113 0.092 0.039 0.092 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Graph of Self-Efficacy vs. Opportunity Perception 
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Figure 2. Graph of Opportunity Perception and Fear of Failure over Time 
 
 42 
Figure 3. Graph of CEE vs. Non-CEE TEA over Time 
 
Figure 4. Graph of Necessity vs. Opportunity Entrepreneurship in CEE over Time 
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IX. Appendix 
EBRD Transition Indicators 
Formerly communist countries 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CROATIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Small scale privatisation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Price liberalisation 2.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Trade & Forex system 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 
ESTONIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Price liberalisation 1.0 2.3 2.7 2.7 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 
HUNGARY Large scale privatisation 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Price liberalisation 2.7 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
LATVIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Price liberalisation 1.0 1.0 2.7 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 
LITHUANIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Price liberalisation 1.0 2.3 2.7 2.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
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Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 
POLAND Large scale privatisation 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Small scale privatisation 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Price liberalisation 2.3 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 
ROMANIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.7 
Price liberalisation 1.0 1.0 2.7 2.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Price liberalisation 1.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
SLOVENIA Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Small scale privatisation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Price liberalisation 2.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Trade & Forex system 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Small scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Price liberalisation 1.0 1.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Trade & Forex system 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
OTHER NON-
CEE 
FORMERLY 
COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES 
(AVERAGE) 
Large scale privatisation 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Small scale privatisation 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Governance/enterprise restructuring 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Price liberalisation 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Trade & Forex system 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Competition Policy 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
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Important Variables and Descriptions 
VARIABLE NAME CODE VARIABLE LABEL 
COUNTRY   NUMERIC COUNTRY [PHONE] CODE  
CEE   CEE COUNTRY INDICATOR 
  0 Other country 
  1 
Country = Hungary, Romania, Poland, Latvia, 
Croatia, or Slovenia 
YEAR   YEAR SURVEYED 
POSTREC   POST-RECESSION YEAR INDICATOR 
  0 Year = 2007 or earlier 
  1 Year = 2008 or later 
Demographic control variables 
INCOME   
HOUSEHOLD INCOME: RECODED INTO 
THIRDS 
  33 lowest 33% tile 
  3467 middle 33% tile 
  68100 upper 33%tile 
EDUC   HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
  111 up to some secondary education 
  1212 secondary degree 
  1316 post secondary 
  1720 graduate experience 
WORK   
GEM HARMONIZED WORK STATUS: 3 
CATEGORIES 
  10 working, full-time or part-time 
  20 not working 
  30 retired, students 
FEMALE   RESPONDENT GENDER  
  0 male 
  1 female 
AGE   RESPONDENT EXACT AGE 
Entrepreneurial perceptions (asked of general population) 
OPPORT   
In the next six months will there be good 
opportunities for starting a business in the area 
where you live? 
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
SUSKILL   
You have the knowledge, skill and experience 
required to start a new business? 
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
FEARFAIL   
Fear of failure would prevent you from starting 
a business? 
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
NBGOODC   
In your country, most people consider starting a 
new business a desirable career choice? 
  0 NO 
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  1 YES 
NBSTATUS   
In your country, those successful at starting a 
new business have a high level of status and 
respect? 
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
NBMEDIA   
In your country, you will often see stories in 
the public media about successful new 
businesses?  
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
Entrepreneurial activity and motivations (asked only of entrepreneurs) 
TEA   
Identified as nascent entrepreneur or new 
business owner as part of Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) 
  0 NO 
  1 YES 
SUREASON/ OMREASON   Entrepreneurial motivation? 
  1 
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BUSINESS 
OPPORTUNITY 
  2 NO BETTER CHOICE FOR WORK 
  3 COMBINATION OF BOTH OF THE ABOVE 
  4 
HAVE A JOB BUT SEEK BETTER 
OPPORTUNITY 
TEAOPP   
(Recoded) entrepreneurial motivation, indicator 
for opportunity entrepreneur31 
  0 NECESSITY OR NON-ENTREPRENEUR 
  1 OPPORTUNITY ENTREPRENEUR 
TEAOPP2   
Entrepreneurial motivation among those who 
have a choice32 
  0 
NON-ENTREPRENEUR (but not unemployed; 
unemployed and necessity entrepreneurs are 
coded as missing) 
  1 OPPORTUNITY ENTREPRENEUR 
TEANEC  Indicator for necessity entrepreneur 
  0 OPPORTUNITY OR NON-ENTREPRENEUR 
  1 NECESSITY ENTREPRENEUR 
                                               
31 Derived from SUREASON (startup reason) and OMREASON (owner-manager reason), both of which 
ask the respective respondent whether they started their business to take advantage of a business 
opportunity or had no better choice for work. TEAOPP = 1 if SUREASON/OMREASON = 1 and TEA = 1. 
32 I use TEAOPP2 when looking at the opportunity entrepreneurship as a choice relative to the general 
population sample, but I use TEAOPP when conditioning on being an entrepreneur (if TEA = 1) to act as a 
binary indicator of opportunity versus necessity entrepreneurship.  
  
 
